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A theoretical model is advanced that demonstrates that, if teacher and student attendance 
generate a shared good, then teacher and student attendance will be mutually reinforcing.  
Using data from the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, empirical evidence supporting 
that proposition is advanced.  Controlling for the endogeneity of teacher and student 
attendance, the most powerful factor raising teacher attendance is the attendance of the 
children in the school, and the most important factor influencing child attendance is the 
presence of the teacher.  The results suggest that one important avenue to be explored in 
developing policies to reduce teacher absenteeism is to focus on raising the attendance of 
children.  
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Introduction 
 One of the most vexing obstacles on the path to universal literacy is teacher 
absenteeism in developing countries.  Poor countries struggle to pay for enough teachers for 
their schools, but resources are wasted when teachers shirk their responsibilities.  Teacher 
absenteeism rates have been found to be quite high in developed countries averaging 19% for 
primary school teachers (Chaudhury et al. 2006; Das et al. 2007).  The 11% absenteeism rate 
in Peru is the lowest of the rates reported, but is still more than double the rates in developed 
countries.  Furthermore, the national averages mask large variations within countries.  In 
India where teachers are absent 25% of the time, rates are as high as 42% in the state of 
Jharkhand ( Kremer, et al., 2005).  
 One factor that seems to explain high teacher absenteeism is the lack of adequate 
supervision which makes it possible for teachers to shirk without penalty.  This problem is 
particularly acute in rural areas where supervision might require significant travel, but even 
in cities teacher absenteeism can be a serious problem.  Contributing to the problem are 
generous leave policies that allow teachers to miss 10% or more of the class days.  Myriad 
other duties take teachers away from the classroom, including training, meetings with 
superiors, and administrative responsibilities.  In the countries surveyed by Chaudhury et al. 
(2004), official leaves and work obligations accounted for between 25% and 86% of the 
teacher absences.   
 However, even in countries with generous leave policies, there is tremendous 
variation in attendance rates among teachers.  Some will use all their allotment while others 
do not use the leaves they are allowed.  A number of hypotheses have been advanced to 
explain this variation in teacher attendance, including pay, working conditions, opportunities 
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for alternative employment outside teaching, and traveling distance to school. Especially 
among female teachers, family responsibilities can also lead to absences.  In addition, 
inadequate supervision and monitoring insulate teachers from accountability for their 
performance (Majumdar, 2001).  Studies show that while 35 out of 600 rural private schools 
in India reported incidence of teacher suspension due to absence or negligence, only 1 out of 
3,000 teachers in rural public schools is suspended for the same reason (Kremer et al. 2005).  
 Econometric evidence of the determinants of teacher absenteeism in developing 
countries is limited, and research has failed to generate consistent results.  Chaudhury et al. 
(2004, 2006) estimated teacher absenteeism regressions for six countries and found no 
variable to be consistently significant across the six regressions.  Of the 22 variables 
(excluding the constant term and survey wave dummies) used in their multi-country 
regressions (Chaudhury et al., 2006), only six were statistically significant despite nearly 
35,000 observations.  Barely half of those variables had coefficients of the same sign in more 
than one-half of the countries.  Even teacher salaries do not have consistent effects on teacher 
attendance, no doubt because salaries are set by civil service rules and not performance. 
Nevertheless, two results emerge consistently in the estimates.  Monitoring, as measured by 
the school’s proximity to the Ministry of Education and the frequency of recent school 
inspections, appears to raise attendance, as does having students with more educated parents.   
 Several countries have experimented with programs that improve school and teacher 
monitoring.  In rural EDUCO schools in El Salvador, a community organization was 
contracted by the central education agency to be responsible for hiring and firing teachers 
and for closely monitoring their performance.  Jimenez and Sawada (1999) found that, 
compared with non-EDUCO schools, teacher absences and student absences in EDUCO 
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schools were lower. In the state of Rajasthan in India, schools that were required to provide a 
photograph of the teacher and students using a digital camera with a time /date feature 
improved attendance (Duflo and Hanna 2005).  The program resulted in an immediate 
improvement in teacher attendance. Teacher absenteeism was halved in the treatment 
schools, dropping from an average of 36 percent in the comparison schools to 18 percent in 
the treatment schools.  In contrast, Kremer and Chen (2001) reported that when school 
headmasters in Kenya were given monitoring responsibility, there was no change in teacher 
absence.1 The policy implication being drawn from these studies is that strong or high-stakes 
incentives such as pay-for-performance may be needed to discourage shirking.   
 Our study examines another avenue for improving teacher attendance—that teacher 
attendance depends on the attitudes and behaviors of students themselves, as reflected by 
student attendance.  The intriguing possibility we pursue in this paper is that, even in the 
absence of close monitoring and extrinsic incentives, teachers attend because their students 
show up and students attend because their teachers show up.  We couch this possibility in the 
context of a matching process between teachers and students in which both parties gain 
utility when both show up, but where both have outside options that also provide utility.  In 
that context, teachers who believe their students are only weakly committed to attend will 
have more absences, and children who believe their teacher is prone to shirking will also 
shirk. In the Chaudhury et al. (2004) analysis, for example, the attributes of the children and 
their parents were at least as important as the attributes of the teachers or the school.  That 
result should not be surprising in that teacher attendance rates can vary dramatically within a 
                                                          
1 Study by Michael Kremer and David Chen cited in Banerjee and Duflo (2006) 
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country among teachers with standardized contracts, qualifications, curricula, and working 
conditions.   
 We illustrate the performance of this matching process using a unique data set 
composed of a representative sample of primary teachers and a random sample of their 
students collected in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan in 1994-95.   We find that 
by far the most important factor for teacher attendance is a higher probability that their 
students attend, and that the most important factor for child attendance is also a higher 
likelihood that the teacher will appear.  The implication is that policies crafted to increase 
child attendance, such as conditional transfer programs that require a specified level of child 
attendance, will have the collateral benefit of raising the attendance of the teachers in local 
schools. Likewise, policies such as those that give the community some power to monitor 
teacher behavior in local schools will have the associated benefit of better student attendance.    
 The next section lays out a simple model that demonstrates the nature of the match 
between the teacher and the child and/or his parents.  The theory motivates an empirical 
strategy that is outlined in Section III.  Section IV gives a detail description of the data while 
Section V lays out the results. 
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II. Model 
 The economic models that have been applied to frame issues regarding teachers 
include those that treat teachers’ educational background and years of experience as inputs 
into a production function for student achievement;2 those that describe the accountability 
relationship between the teacher and the community (made up of local parents and their 
children and/or their representatives in school administration);3 and those that focus on the 
labor supply behavior of teachers as being one of income optimization constrained by the 
disutility from effort exerted.4 While the last model is frequently used to examine why 
individuals enter or remain in the teaching profession, the model applies more generally to 
teacher choices regarding how much effort to expend.  
One aspect of being a teacher that none of these models emphasizes is that  teachers 
may derive utility from their professional practice beyond the salary they receive. Certainly 
many professions may offer hedonic returns in the form of pride of accomplishment or 
prestige among ones peers, but a unique aspect of being a teacher is that the process of 
instruction and its ultimate output are intrinsically a product of the joint efforts by the teacher 
and by the student. We stress this feature of the production process because the concerns 
about frequent teacher absences and about irregular attendance by students, as demonstrated 
in our literature review, is underpinned by the belief that the teaching-learning process 
requires the direct interaction between teacher and student. Thus, when either teacher or 
student is absent, the learning process is incomplete. Furthermore, the frequency and duration 
                                                          
2 Glewwe (2002) reviews the educational production literature. 
3 Podgursky and Springer (2007) present a review of compensation options to resolve the principal agent 
problem in education 
4 Two early examples of empirical models of teacher labor supply include Theobald (1990) and Stinebrickner 
(1998). 
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of this interaction contributes to learning because it allows the two parties to know each 
other. A teacher doesn’t start off knowing a student’s endowments (e.g., ability to learn, 
ability to focus, persistence), and so it may take a few meetings to understand how best to 
teach a class.  Similarly, a student may need a few classes to get to know and adapt to a 
teacher’s style of teaching. This way of framing the teacher-student relationship recognizes 
that interaction, cooperation and mutual adjustment are all aspects of the teaching-learning 
process. 
To capture this joint and cooperative production of learning, we note that teachers and 
students are two parties in a mutually beneficial contractual relationship.   To model the 
teacher-student relationship, we draw on the framework Becker(1974) advanced to model 
marriage as well as the extensions by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney 
(1981).  As with a marriage, teachers and students cooperate to produce a “shared good” 
which raises utility for both parties.5 The key feature of a shared good is that it cannot be 
produced without the participation of both teachers and students.  In the classroom context, 
examples of a shared good are the satisfaction from the learning that takes place, a productive 
mentor-mentee relationship, and the status conferred by the community to teachers and 
students of a well-run school.6 In the model below, we treat attendance (or absences) as a 
simple (minimalist) measure of the frequency and quality of the interaction between the 
parties.  
 Let ்݈ and ݈஼ be the hours the teacher (T) and the child (C) attend such that ்݈, ݈஼ א
ሾ0,1ሿ.  The teacher or student shirk by their absence, setting ்݈ ൏ 1, or ݈஼ ൏ 1. We assume 
                                                          
5 The concept of a “shared good” is different from that of a “public good” in the sense when a number of 
households are created through corresponding matches in the marriage market, a “public good” may be enjoyed 
by multiple households whereas a “shared good” is enjoyed only within a household. 
6 See Coleman (1988), Becker (1974) and Putnam (2000) for classic developments of the social capital concept. 
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that the shared good is produced using a constant elasticity of substitution production process 
using student and teacher time.  The amount of the shared good, G, produced is  
ܩ ൌ ሺߚ் ்݈
ఘ ൅ ߚ஼ ݈஼
ఘሻ
ଵ
ఘ 
Teacher’s attendance decision 
 The teacher’s total utility is additive in utility from the shared good, U(G), and goods 
purchased with income derived from teaching and other activities.  The teacher earns a unit 
wage of ݓ்.  Total wages paid to a nonshirking teacher will be ்ܹேௌ ൌ ݓ்.  An observed 
absence results in forfeiture of income for the period the teacher is absent.  On the other 
hand, time away from school has value of ݓ଴் to the teacher, either because the teacher has 
an alternative job or because the teacher values time in home production.  We assume that for 
the (1 െ ்݈ሻ share of time the teacher is absent, s/he earns ሺ1 െ ்݈ሻ ݓ଴் working away from 
school.   Consequently, if the teacher shirks and is caught, wage income is ்ܹௌ஼ ൌ ݓ்்݈ ൅
ݓ଴்ሺ1 െ  ்݈ሻ. 
 As is often the case in developing countries, teachers’ attendance is monitored with 
error7.  If the teacher shirks and is not caught his income is ்ܹௌே஼ ൌ ݓ் ൅ ݓ଴்ሺ1 െ  ்݈ሻ.  
More generally, let the teachers’ absence be observed by a supervisor with probability ߙ.  
Then the teacher’s expected income from shirking will be ்ܹௌ ൌ ൫1 െ ߙሺ1 െ ்݈ሻ൯ݓ் ൅
ݓ଴்ሺ1 െ  ்݈ሻ.  The nonshirking wage is a special case of this formulation, as setting ்݈ ൌ 1 
implies that the expected income is ݓ். 
                                                          
7 In a study on students dropout at Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan King, Orazem and Paterno found in 
a spotcheck that 20% of the teachers were absent, the official attendance however showed only 5% were absent. 
(King, et al., 1999) 
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 Assuming the child’s time in school is given, the teacher’s decision is to select ்݈ so 
as to maximize expected utility,  
max௟೅ ܧ்ܷ ൌ ൫1 െ ߙሺ1 െ ்݈ሻ൯ݓ் ൅ ݓ଴்ሺ1 െ  ்݈ሻ ൅ ܷሺሺߚ்்݈
ఘ ൅ ߚ஼݈஼
ఘሻଵ/ఘሻሻ. 
The teacher’s first-order condition is  
ܯ்ܷሺܩሻ ൅ ߙݓ் ൌ  ܷᇱሺܩሻሺߚ்்݈
ఘ ൅ ߚ஼݈஼
ఘሻ
ଵ
ఘିଵߚ்்݈
ఘିଵ ൅ ߙݓ் ൒ ݓ଴்                   ሺ1ሻ 
where the left-hand-side of the inequality is the marginal utility the teacher derives from 
devoting time to school, equal to the gain from the generated shared good plus the expected 
teacher income from reduced chance of being caught shirking; and the right-hand-side is the 
value of time from shirking full time.  The teacher would set ்݈ ൌ 0 and never attend if the 
inequality is violated so that the benefit of any time spent in school is never greater than that 
spent outside school.  At the other extreme, the teacher sets ்݈ ൌ 1 and always attends if the 
marginal utility of shared good plus expected income from attendance is greater than the 
value of time away from school.  More generally, condition (1) holds with equality and so the 
teacher will spend at least some time shirking.  Shirking increases as the probability of being 
caught decreases, as the value of time out of school increases, and as teacher salary and the 
marginal utility of the shared good decreases.  Assuming an interior solution, the teacher’s 
equation governing time allocated to school will be of the form: 
 ்݈כ ൌ ்݈ሺ݈஼, ߙ, ݓ், ݓ଴்ሻ                  ሺ2ሻ               
Child’s attendance decision 
 The child’s attendance choice, or that of the parent acting on behalf of the child, 
involves selecting ݈஼ so as to maximize expected utility.  The child has an opportunity cost of 
time spent in school, ݓ଴஼, that represents the larger of either the value of time spent in home 
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production or the wage in the local market for child labor.  The child time allocation 
problem, assuming ்݈ is fixed, is  
max
௟಴
ܧܷ஼ ൌ ݓ଴஼ሺ1 െ ݈஼ሻ ൅ ܷሺሺߚ்்݈
ఘ ൅ ߚ஼݈஼
ఘሻଵ/ఘሻሻ 
The child’s first order condition is: 
ܯܷ஼ሺܩሻ ൌ  ܷᇱሺܩሻ൫ߚ்்݈
ఘ ൅ ߚ஼݈஼
ఘ൯
ଵ
ఘିଵߚ஼݈஼
ఘିଵ ൒ ݓ଴஼              ሺ3ሻ 
If the inequality is violated, the value of child time outside school exceeds the value in school 
and so ݈஼ ൌ 0.  On the other hand, if the marginal utility of the shared good exceeds the 
opportunity cost of time, then the child attendance decision is ݈஼ ൌ 1.  In general, there will 
be an interior decision so (3) holds with equality.  The child’s reduced form equation 
governing time allocated to school will be of the form: 
݈஼כ ൌ ݈஼ሺ்݈, ݓ଴஼ሻ                                    ሺ4ሻ                                         
 The teacher’s and student’s reduced form equations represent two equations in the 
unknowns ݈஼ and ்݈.  From (2) and (4), it is clear that teachers’ attendance will depend on the 
elements of the child’s attendance function and students’ attendance will depend on the 
arguments in the teacher’s attendance.  The equilibrium solution requires that the expected 
and the actual attendance are the same so that children fully anticipate the teacher’s 
attendance and the teacher fully anticipates the child’s attendance.  In that case, ்݈כ ൌ ்݈ and 
݈஼כ ൌ ݈஼.   Furthermore, the amount of the shared good G in (1) is the same as in (3).  
Rearranging the conditions (1) and (3) yields 
ݓ଴் െ ߙݓ்
ߚ்்݈
ఘିଵ ൌ
ݓ଴஼  
ߚ஼݈஼
ఘିଵ                            ሺ5ሻ 
Applying our maintained assumption of an interior solution in (1), MUT >0 which implies 
that the numerator on the left-hand-side must be positive.  That in turn requires that the value 
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of a teacher’s time away from school must exceed the expected lost wage from being caught 
shirking.  Because both sides of equation (5) are positive, we know that any factor that raises 
teachers’ attendance will also increase students’ attendance, and so there will be a positive 
correlation between their attendance decisions. We will test these predictions in the empirical 
work below. 
 III.  Empirical Strategy 
We are interested in estimating equations (2) and (4) from our theory. The linear 
approximation to the functional form in (2) is  
்݈ ൌ ߛ஼்݈஼ ൅ ߛ௪்ݓ் ൅ ߛ଴்ݓ଴் ൅  ߛఈ்ߙ ൅ ߝ்                 ሺ6ሻ               
The specification shows that teacher attendance will depend on student attendance and 
measures of the teacher’s expected return from spending time inside and outside of class. The 
teacher’s compensation ݓ் includes the teacher’s salary and also working conditions such as 
the availability of furniture in the school, commuting distance from home to school, and 
whether the teacher has head teacher or other supervisory responsibilities besides teaching. 
The teacher’s incentive to attend school will also reflect the likelihood of being caught 
shirking, ߙ.  The chance of being caught increases with the degree of supervision which will 
be stricter in private schools and would also likely vary with the number of other teachers in 
the school.8  Attendance will also vary negatively with factors that raise the value of teacher 
time outside school, holding constant the salary paid in the school.  These include the 
teacher’s human capital (age and education) and the factors that alter the value of time in 
household production (gender, marital status, and number of young children). 
                                                          
8 Fewer teachers can make collusive arrangements to share attendance, and more teachers would mean more 
chances of being observed absent.  Nevertheless, one of the authors recalls a series of school visits in which the 
one teacher schools had one teacher present; the two teacher school had one teacher present and the three 
teacher school had one teacher present. 
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 The linear approximation to (4) provides an equation explaining child attendance 
݈஼ ൌ ߛ்
஼்݈ ൅ ߛ଴
஼ݓ଴஼ ൅ ߝ஼                 ሺ7ሻ 
The child’s attendance will depend on the teacher’s attendance and on the value of the child’s 
time outside, relative to the value inside, school.  The relative value of time inside versus 
outside class depends on school amenities such as furniture, class size, and teacher attributes 
and on child age, gender, health and home attributes (parent and sibling demographics, 
wealth, and distance from school).  
 We could estimate (6) and (7) directly if we assume that child attendance is 
exogenous to the teacher and teacher attendance is exogenous to the child.  The theory 
suggests, however, that this exogeneity assumption is not credible.  The existence of a shared 
good between teachers and students is consistent with positive estimates of the coefficients ்݈஼ 
and ݈஼்.  Therefore, we propose two alternative strategies to test for evidence of a positive 
correlation between teacher and student attendance consistent with a shared good. 
 First, consider the projection of the teacher’s and child’s attendance on their own 
exogenous variables  
்݈ ൌ ߠ௪் ݓ் ൅ ߠ଴்ݓ଴் ൅ ߠఈ்ߙ ൅ ߤ்   (8A) 
݈஼ ൌ ߠ଴
஼ݓ଴஼ ൅ ߤ஼                       (8B) 
 
The error term ߤ் is orthogonal to all teacher household and school attributes, and the error 
term ߤ஼ is be orthogonal to child household and school attributes.  We can then examine 
whether COV(ߤ், ߤ஼ሻ > 0 to establish whether the unobservable factors raising teacher and 
student attendance are positively correlated as suggested by the theory. 
 The other strategy is to use (8A) and (8B) to suggest instruments for ݈஼ and ்݈ 
in (6) and (7), yielding the structural equations 
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்݈ ൌ ߜ஼்ܧሺ݈஼|ݓ଴஼ሻ ൅  ߜ௪் ݓ் ൅ ߜ଴்ݓ଴் ൅  ߜఈ்ߙ ൅ ߞ்   (9A) 
 
݈஼ ൌ ߜ்
஼ܧሺ்݈|ݓ଴், ݓ், ߙሻ ൅ ߜ଴
஼ݓ଴஼ ൅ ߞ஼   (9B) 
Estimating (8A,B) and (9A,B) simultaneously provides unbiased estimates of the coefficients 
ߜ஼் and ߜ஼் which must be positive to be consistent with the prediction from the theory. 
IV.   Data 
Survey Characteristics 
A sample of 257 primary schools was selected from a population of over 20,000 schools in 
NWFP, Pakistan.  Sixty-eight percent of the selected schools were situated in rural areas, 
with school management divided between government schools (76%), mosque schools (7%), 
and private schools (17%), in proportion to their presence among the universe of schools.  
The data collection occurred during the spring of 1994.   
  At each school, a teacher from each of the first three grades was selected at random. 
In schools with fewer than four teachers in the first three grades, all teachers were sampled. 
A total of 650 teachers were interviewed from 257 schools to obtain information on teacher 
household and school attributes. Information on teachers’ absence was obtained from two 
sources- the official attendance register kept at the school and a spot check of teacher 
attendance conducted during unannounced visits to the school.   
 In each of the teachers’ classes, two children were selected at random for the child 
attendance sample.  For each child, daily attendance from the attendance register was 
obtained as well as a spot check on the same day as the teacher.  For each child, an 
interviewer was dispatched to the household to administer a detailed survey of household 
demographics and socioeconomic status.   
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Dependent Variables 
 Because of the possibility that official attendance was inconsistent with actual 
attendance, we conducted spot checks of teacher and student attendance and compared them 
with the attendance records kept at the school.  The comparison is reported in Table 1.  
Because the register contains attendance over several months and the spot check data were 
collected on only two days, the two series may not coincide exactly, but there are some clear 
discrepancies in the teachers’ official attendance records.  For both private and government 
schools, official absences greatly understate the true absences of teachers, especially in 
government schools.  However, the official attendance information for students coincides 
reasonably well overall.  In addition, surveyors checked if the students listed as present were 
indeed in school that day, and they reported reasonable accuracy of student presence or 
absence.  The same could not be said for teachers, numerous discrepancies were found 
between reported attendance and the spot check.  We use the teachers’ spot check attendance 
as our dependent variable for the teachers’ equation and the official attendance register data 
for the students.9 
 Independent Variable Selection 
The theory suggested three factors that influence whether a teacher shows up in school on a 
given day.  We assign variables from the surveys that reflect these variables.  Note that some 
may fit in more than one category. 
                                                          
9 There is a danger in using the spot check for both in that absent teachers may cause absent students.  
Interestingly, the surveyors found that even when teachers were absent, the present teachers were very careful to 
take accurate attendance data for the students including those students in the classrooms of the absent teachers.   
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• ݓ்: incentives to atte݊݀.  The most obvious incentive to attend is the teacher’s 
salary.  However, the teacher may still be paid, even if the teacher shirks.10  School 
furnishings such as desks, chairs, and blackboards affect the quality of the work 
environment.  Some teachers are given administrative responsibilities beyond their 
teaching which can also affect the quality of the job. 
• ݓை்: the opportunity cost of time in school.  One likely source of higher 
opportunity cost of attendance will be due to household responsibilities.  Teachers 
who are married and who have children under age five have greater value of time 
in the home.  Commuting time from the teacher’s home to school raises the cost of 
attendance.   Finally, noting that the teacher’s salary is also included in the 
regressors, teacher’s with greater endowments of skill that are valued outside 
school will have alternative earning possibilities outside school.  We include the 
teacher’s age and education.  
• ߙ: The probability of being caught shirking.  Schools with more teachers have 
greater opportunity to pass on responsibilities to another teacher, but there are also 
more difficulties in establishing collusive agreements on shirking.  Private schools 
are reputed to have closer supervision and no constraints on dismissal which 
increases the costs of shirking.   
For the child’s attendance equation, the key issue is the relative value of child time out of 
school versus in school.   
                                                          
10 The Pakistan teacher contract lists many legal reasons to skip that may allow the teacher to be absent 20% of 
the time or more and still earn full pay.  Legal absences include sickness, official business, maternity, earned 
vacation, training, and up to 25 days of “casual leave” for which no reason is necessary. 
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II. ݓ଴஼: the opportunity cost of child time.  A child’s productivity outside relative to 
inside school will reflect the child’s age, health and gender.  Having more siblings 
in the home can affect both ability to pay for schooling and represent an 
additional need for child time.  The presence and abilities of parents affect the 
ability of the household to produce without using children to produce.  Similarly, 
household wealth, measured as the first principal component of a vector of 
household asset measures, indicates the ability of the household to afford devoting 
child time to school.11  Finally, commuting time from home to school increase the 
cost of devoting child time to school.  School quality is indexed by school 
furnishings and whether the school is under private versus government 
management. 
V.   RESULTS   
 Our model suggests that there will be a strong correlation between teachers’ 
attendance and that of their students.  The simple correlation is 0.47, although ione might 
suspect that is due to common school attributes.   
 To investigate the interrelationship between child and teacher attendance more 
carefully, we report results of the teachers’ attendance equations in Table 3 and the students’ 
equations are given in Table 4. The first column in each table reports the coefficients from 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of equations (8A) and (8B).  The key take away from 
those estimates is how little of the variation in teacher and child attendance can be explained 
                                                          
11 We follow Filmer and Pritchett (2001) in aggregating a large vector of household attributes into a single 
measure. The thirteen household attributes include measures of the quality of home construction; availability of 
telephone, water, sewer and electricity; household human capital including measures of occupation and literacy; 
and possession of various household appliances and electronics. 
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by their own household and school information.  The teachers’ demographic household and 
school information explains only 8% of the variation in teacher attendance while the 
children’s demographics, household attributes and school characteristics only explain 6% of 
the children’s attendance variation.  The error term from the teachers’ regression will be 
orthogonal to teachers’ demographic, household and school attributes while the error terms 
from the children’s regression will be orthogonal to the children’s demographic, household 
and school attributes.  Nevertheless, the teacher and child errors are correlated at 0.41.  The 
unobserved heterogeneity (to the econometrician) in child and teacher attendance are 
significantly positively correlated.   
 Equations (9A) and (9B) provide a structural model that will allow us to directly 
estimate the effect of predictable teacher attendance on child attendance and predictable child 
attendance on teacher attendance.  We estimate the system jointly using seemingly unrelated 
regression. The results are reported in the second columns of Tables 3 and 4, respectively. 
However, we first estimated each of the equations independently to derive a measure of the 
attendance variation that can be explained when we add the predicted child attendance to the 
teachers’ equation and the predicted teachers’ attendance to the children’s equation.  The 
increase in the R2 is dramatic.  Adding predicted child’s attendance to the teachers’ equation 
raises the percent of explained variation in teachers’ attendance from 8% to 28%.  Adding 
predicted teacher attendance in to the model explaining the students’ attendance raises the 
percent of explained variation from 6% to 25%.  It seems apparent that attendance is a joint 
decision between teachers and students, consistent with the prediction suggested by equation 
(5).   
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 The key parameter in Table 3 is that on children’s attendance that is predicted on 
knowledge of the children’s home environments and characteristics of the school.  The 
coefficient of 0.87 is highly significant and suggests that 100% child attendance will raise the 
teachers’ attendance by 87 percentage points.  At sample means, the elasticity is 0.83, and so 
a 10% increase in child attendance raises teacher attendance by 8.3%.   The key parameter in 
Table 4 is that on teachers’ attendance that can be predicted from knowledge of the teacher’s 
household attributes and characteristics of the school.   The coefficient is 0.39 and highly 
significant with an implied elasticity of 0.41.  A 10% increase in teacher attendance increases 
child attendance by 4%.  There are no other factors that matter more for teacher attendance 
than the attendance of their students, and there is no large influence on child attendance than 
the consistent presence of the teacher.  Policies that encourage the attendance of one will 
increase the attendance of the other. 
 For example, conditional transfer programs have been shown to increase how 
regularly children attend school in Latin America.  Our results suggest that conditional cash 
transfers aimed at raising children’s attendance will also increase how regularly teachers 
attend.  Alternatively, the use of date-time digital cameras increases the attendance of 
teachers in rural India.  Our results suggest that children in those communities will attend 
more regularly as well. 
 For the other variables, there are several avenues where policy could increase teacher 
attendance suggested by the results in Table 3.  Family responsibilities appear to exacerbate 
teacher absenteeism, given the negative effects of teacher marital status and children on 
attendance.  Attendance is greater in larger schools, presumably because of better monitoring 
of teacher attendance.  Attendance is significantly higher in private schools where monitoring 
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is greater and punishment for absenteeism more severe.  Finally, teachers who have more 
administrative responsibilities attend more regularly as well.  Our results show that policies 
that raise teacher attendance will increase time children spend in school.   
 The regressions in Table 4 do not provide clear policy avenues to raise children’s 
attendance.  It is clear that children attend private school more regularly, and other studies 
have demonstrated that in Pakistan, even low fee private schools generate  better cognitive 
outcomes than government schools (Alderman et al., 2001). Experimental work has shown 
that a girls school scholarship program that tied a tuition payment to attendance raised girls’ 
attendance significantly in Balochistan Province of Pakistan (Kim et al., 1999; Alderman et 
al., 2003), and perhaps that is an avenue that could be explored in future research. 
VI. Conclusion  
 This paper develops a theoretical model that shows that teacher and student 
attendance are intimately entwined and thus they base their own attendance decision on the 
predicted attendance of the other.  The production function for learning in the classroom does 
require inputs of time from both teacher and student, so teacher performance and student 
performance are closely associated. Research shows that, especially in the early schooling 
years, the quality and frequency of the interaction between teacher and student lead to more 
learning (e.g., Martin and Dowson 2009). For this reason, governments and school 
administrators use a variety of incentives to elicit better performance from teachers.  
We propose that the interaction between teacher and student produces a shared good 
which serves as an additional motivation for both the teacher and the student not to be absent. 
The existence of this motivation means that a weaker incentive than those being tried by 
governments (e.g., performance-linked pay, cash rewards for attendance, contract tenure for 
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teachers)12 may suffice to improve teacher attendance as long as students come to school 
regularly. Thus, programs that raise student attendance (especially if those entail lower 
additional cost) would have the effect of raising teacher attendance as well. While the shared 
good is unobservable, its existence creates a positive correlation in the error terms of 
equations explaining student and teacher attendance based solely on their own attributes and 
those of the school.  We verify that prediction using data on teacher and student attendance 
from primary schools in Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan.  We also find evidence 
consistent with a second prediction:  a dramatic increase in the fit of models of teacher 
attendance when we add predicted child attendance, and similarly, a dramatic increase in the 
explained variation in child attendance when predicted teacher attendance enters the model.  
                                                          
12 See, for example, Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2010), Podgursky and Springer (2007), and Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman (2010).   
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Table 1. Comparison of Spotcheck and Official Teacher and Student Absences in 267 
Schools in Northwest Frontier Province, Pakistan 
 Total Government Private 
Teachers    
Spotcheck 13.1% 16.3% 7.1% 
Official 8.1% 8.7% 4.1% 
Children    
Spotcheck 15.0% 16.0% 12.0% 
Official 15.3% 12.3% 16.3% 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on spotchecks of child and student attendance and inspection of official 
attendance rosters of schools conducted by area learning coordinators in Northwest Frontier Province, Pakistan.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variablesa 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Type Description 
Teachers : Explanatory variables and Moments 
Age 30.6 0.27  Age of the teachers 
Male   0.66 0.02 D =1 if the teacher is Male 
Highest academic 
qualification 
3.72 0.03 C Six categories includedb 
Married 1.61 0.03 C Two Categoriesc
Number of small 
children  
0.92 0.04  Less than the age of four 
Commuting time  30.9 1.02  In minutes 
Monthly salary  1896 20.5  In Rupees 
Other responsibilities 0.38 0.01 D Responsibilities other than teaching 
Schools : Explanatory Variables and Moments 
Number of Teachers  4.92 3.94  Total teachers in the primary school 
Furniture  0.50  0.35  Includes toilet, black-board, chairs and 
tables 
Private   0.17 0.38 D =1 if privately owned 
Children : Explanatory variables and Moments 
age   7.41 1.38  Age of the student 
Male   0.67 0.47 D =1 if gender is Male 
Healthy   0.95 0.22  =1 if student is healthy 
Distance from school  1.35 3.05  In kilometer 
Siblings  3.88 1.94  Number of brothers and sisters 
Dad present 0.91 0.28 D =1 if present 
Mom present   0.94 0.25 D =1 if present 
Education of dad 4.62 5.05   
Education of mom 0.94 2.46   
Wealth  5.44 3.90  Index of wealth created from household 
interview 
Dependent Variable 
Teachers’ Attendance 86.9 31.1 D =100 if the Teacher is present on two 
spotchecks 
Children’s Attendance 84.7 18.9  =100 if the child attends full time on the 
attendance register 
aVariable Type:, “D” refers to Dummy and “C” refers to Categorical 
b1≡6th Grade Pass, 2≡8th Grade Pass, 3≡Matric,4≡FA/FSc,5≡BA/Bsc,6≡MA/Msc 
c1≡Never married, 2≡Married, Widowed 
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Table 3. Least squares and Seemingly Unrelated Regression estimates of  
teachers’ spot-check attendance 
 
 
Spot check 
attendance (OLS) 
Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression conducted jointly 
with column 2 in table 4 
Constant 91.1** 
(6.4) 
27.7* 
(15.41) 
Male (=1 if gender is Male) 2.87 
(2.50) 
-1.53 
(2.10) 
Age 0.738** 
(0.17) 
1.014** 
(0.23) 
highest academic 
qualification 
-2.13* 
(1.23) 
-0.408 
(1.20) 
Married -12.5** 
(2.60) 
-7.56* 
(3.75) 
number of small children 
(less than the age of four) 
1.041 
(0.96) 
-1.54 * 
(0.92) 
Commuting time -0.014 
(0.033) 
-0.014 
(0.04) 
Monthly salary -0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(.002) 
Other responsibilities 7.539** 
(1.92) 
4.098** 
(1.55) 
Total number of teachers 0.297 
(0.28) 
0.357* 
(0.20) 
Furniture ( includes desk, 
chair, blackboard) 
5.001 
(3.23) 
-0.184 
(2.93) 
Private 7.12* 
(4.05) 
6.98** 
(3.56) 
Predicted Child attendance - 0.869** 
(0.037) 
ߩ௔ 0.41  
R2 0.08 0.28 
Sample Size 926 772 
Note:Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the school level.  In the seemingly unrelated 
regression, repeated observations on the same teacher were weighted by a factor of 1/n where n is the number of 
children in the student sample that have that teacher.  
a Correlation between the errors from the teachers OLS equation in Table 3 and the students in Table 4 
** : significant at α=0.05 ; *: significant at α=0.10 
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Table 4. Least squares and Seemingly Unrelated Regression estimates of  
Students’ spot-check attendance 
 OLS Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression conducted jointly 
with column 2 in table 4.  
Constant 78.2** 
(6.24) 
43.3** 
(5.68) 
Male (=1 if gender is Male) -1.61 
(1.42) 
1.595 
(1.28) 
Age -0.66 
(0.44) 
-0.086 
(0.35) 
Healthy -0.077 
(2.80) 
-2.559 
(2.47) 
Distance from school 0.19 
(0.21) 
0.053 
(0.29) 
Siblings -0.46 
(0.33) 
0.039 
(0.29) 
Dad present 7.08** 
(3.06) 
1.122 
(2.51) 
Mom present 7.64* 
(3.96) 
6.266 
(4.06) 
Education of dad -0.035 
(0.14) 
0.182 
(0.13) 
Education of mom 0.056 
(0.27) 
-0.006 
(0.26) 
Wealth 0.114 
(0.18) 
0.011 
(0.17) 
Furniture ( includes desk, 
chair, blackboard) 
-1.964 
(2.01) 
-2.21 
(1.99) 
Private 8.247** 
(1.96) 
4.039** 
(2.13) 
Predicted Teacher Attendance - 0.387** 
(0.02) 
ߩ௔ 0.41  
R² 0.06 0.25 
Sample Size 962 772 
Note:Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the school level. In the seemingly unrelated 
regression, repeated observations on the same teacher were weighted by a factor of 1/n where n is the number of 
children in the student sample that have that teacher. 
a Correlation between the errors from the teachers OLS equation in Table 3 and the students in Table 4 
 ** : significant at α=0.05 ; *: significant at α=0.10 
